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Abstract
Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from
expected utility but can be modelled according to rank-dependent utility theory. Under rank-
dependent utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function inﬂuence the
risk attitude of a decision maker. The same deﬁnition of risk aversion leads to two forms of
risk aversion: utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion. The main ﬁnding is that
these two forms can have surprisingly opposite consequences for bargaining solutions that
exhibit a weak monotonicity property. In particular, in a large class of bargaining problems
both increased utility risk aversion and decreased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent
are advantagous for a player. This is demonstrated for the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining
solution. The Nash bargaining solution does not behave regularly in this respect.
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1. Introduction
A bargaining problem is described by a set of potential outcomes, including a so-
called disagreement outcome. The bargainers try to reach agreement on one of the
outcomes or on a lottery between these outcomes. If they fail, the disagreement
outcome results. A bargaining solution suggests an agreement outcome or lottery for
each possible bargaining problem. In this paper, the so-called welfarist approach to
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doi:10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00009-7bargaining is adopted. In this approach, the solution to the bargaining problem
depends exclusively on its image in utility space.
The axiomatic approach to two-person bargaining problems was initiated by Nash
[9], under the assumption that the two bargainers maximize expected utility. In
expected utility, risk aversion is an important empirical phenomenon. Yaari [21]
provides an intuitive deﬁnition of risk aversion and shows that under expected utility
one decision maker is more risk averse than another if and only if the utility function
of the former is a strictly increasing concave transformation of that of the latter. An
interesting question, ﬁrst studied by Kannai [7] and Kihlstrom et al. [8], concerns the
effect of risk aversion on the outcomes predicted by bargaining solutions. Their
answers to this question conﬁrm a plausible intuition: it is advantagous to play
against a more risk averse bargainer. These results are driven by the fact that a more
risk averse bargainer has a more concave utility function. Therefore, utility at low
levels increases at a faster rate and satisfaction may appear faster. Because most
bargaining solutions are sensitive to this, a more risk averse bargainer may be easier
to satisfy, which is advantageous for the opponent (cf. [10]).
Expected utility as a normative basis for decision making is appealing, but as
empirical ﬁndings show, it is descriptively unsatisfactory. Therefore, alternative
models have been developed of which rank-dependent utility [11], which extends
expected utility by allowing for distortion of probabilities, is the best known.
Our paper considers bargaining problems where the bargainers’ preferences can be
represented by rank-dependent utility. In this model Yaari’s concept of increased
risk aversion has still the same natural meaning: a more risk averse person prefers
less lotteries over each riskless alternative. In contrast with expected utility, however,
not only the utility function but also a probability weighting function determines the
risk attitude of a decision maker. An elegant and simple characterization of
increased risk aversion as in the case of expected utility is not yet available.
Chateauneuf and Cohen [2] provide some partial results. Chew et al. [3] characterize
aversion to mean-preserving spreads, which is more restrictive than risk aversion.
In the present paper, two factors of risk aversion are distinguished: utility risk
aversion (as in the expected utility model), associated with the utility function; and
probabilistic risk aversion, associated with the probability weighting function. In our
application to bargaining we concentrate on the latter, because the results for the
former are closely related to those in expected utility. As in the related literature, the
central question is: is it advantagous or disadvantagous to bargain with a more risk
averse person? In Section 3, we investigate the impact of both utility and
probabilistic risk aversion for the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution [6]. The
main ﬁnding is that in a large class of bargaining problems, it is advantagous to have
a less probabilistically risk averse, or a more utility risk averse opponent. The known
effect of risk aversion for the expected utility case (cf. [8]) is a special case of the latter
result. Since both forms of risk aversion arise from the same concept of comparative
risk aversion, this contrast is rather surprising. On closer inspection, however, it is
not counterintuitive that increased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent could
be bad for a player, because such an opponent might insist on larger probabilities for
good alternatives and thereby reduce the other player’s utility.
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bargainers can be dishonest about their true preferences and pretend to evaluate
lotteries by means of a different utility or probability weighting function.
Speciﬁcally, it does not pay to pretend to be less probabilistically risk averse, or
more utility risk averse, but it might sometimes pay to pretend to be more
probabilistically or less utility risk averse. For the expected utility case related papers
in this direction are Crawford and Varian [4] and Sobel [17,18].
Although our focus is on the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution the main results in this
paper can be extended to solutions that exhibit some form of monotonicity.
Typically, these do not include the Nash bargaining solution. If this solution is used,
a more probabilistically risk averse opponent might be better but also worse for a
player. We justify the use of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in bargaining under
rank-dependent utility by showing that the axiomatization of Kalai and
Smorodinsky [6] still makes sense (see Section 4).
Axiomatic bargaining without expected utility has been studied in other articles
[1,13–15,22]. The paper of Volij and Winter [22] is closest to the present paper. It
applies Yaari’s dual theory of choice to bargaining problems where the set of
alternatives consists of all distributions of one unit of a perfectly divisible good, and
uses the stronger notion of aversion to mean-preserving spreads to study changes in
the Nash solution. Shalev [16] has studied the effect of loss aversion—see also
Section 5.
The proofs are collected in the appendix.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Rank-dependent utility
Throughout, the set A of riskless alternatives is a nonempty compact topological
space. A lottery is a probability measure with ﬁnite support on A; typically denoted
by P ¼ð p1;a1;y;pn;anÞ where a1;y;anAA; piX0 for all i; and
Pn
i¼1 pi ¼ 1: The set
of all lotteries is LðAÞ: A riskless alternative aAA is identiﬁed with the lottery
ð1;aÞALðAÞ:
A utility function U : A-R is a continuous function that assigns to each riskless
alternative a real number, expressing its value for a decision maker. A weighting
function is a continuous, strictly increasing function w : ½0;1 -½0;1  with wð0Þ¼0
and wð1Þ¼1; representing the decision maker’s personal appraisal of probabilities.
For a decision maker with utility function U; the preferences over LðAÞ can be
modelled by rank-dependent utility (RDU) if there exists a weighting function w; such





½wðprð1Þ þ ? þ prðiÞÞ wðprð1Þ þ ? þ prði 1ÞÞ UðarðiÞÞ;
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to worse, i.e., Uðarð1ÞÞX?XUðarðnÞÞ (cf. [11]). Expected utility holds if wðpÞ¼p for
all pA½0;1 :
Rank-dependent utility, in contrast to expected utility, permits transformations of
probabilities. An alternative is weighted by the transformed probability of obtaining
the alternative or something better minus the transformed probability of obtaining
something better.
2.2. Comparative risk aversion
Yaari [20] introduced a natural deﬁnition of risk aversion. A decision maker is
more risk averse than another one, if whenever the former (weakly) prefers a lottery
to a riskless alternative the latter also does. In expected utility it is a well-known
result that one decision maker is more risk averse than a second one if the utility
function of the ﬁrst is a strictly increasing concave transformation of that of the
second. Under rank-dependent utility, a second component inﬂuences the risk
attitude, namely, the weighting function. In the lemma below and in the rest of the
paper, we consider these two components separately, by keeping one ﬁxed and
varying the other.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let the preferences over LðAÞ of two decision makers (DM and g DM DM)
be represented by RDU-functionals RDU and g RDU RDU: g DM DM is more risk averse than
DM if for all aAA and all PALðAÞ with g RDU RDUðPÞX g RDU RDUðaÞ also
RDUðPÞXRDUðaÞ:
Lemma 2.2. Let the preferences over LðAÞ of DM and g DM DM be represented by RDU
and g RDU RDU with utility functions U and ˜ U and weighting functions w and ˜ w; respectively.
1. If w ¼ ˜ w then g DM DM is more risk averse than DM if and only if there exists a concave
strictly increasing function k : R-R such that ˜ U ¼ k 3 U:
2. If U ¼ a ˜ U þ b for a;bAR; a40 then g DM DM is more risk averse than DM if
˜ wðpÞpwðpÞ for all pA½0;1 : In particular, if U ¼ ˜ U this implies that
g RDU RDUðPÞpRDUðPÞ for all PALðAÞ:
If A is connected, the ‘‘only if’’ implication in part 2 of Lemma 2.2 also holds. In
the situation of Lemma 2.2, part 1, we say that decision maker g DM DM is more utility
risk averse than decision maker DM; whereas in the situation of Lemma 2.2, part 2,
we say that g DM DM is more probabilistically risk averse than DM: Although the above
result is well known and simple to prove, it was not yet stated as in Lemma 2.2.
Part 1 of the lemma is a generalization of Yaari’s result [20] for expected utility;
a predecessor of part 2 can be found in [21]. A proof can also be deduced from
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that allows for varying utility and weighting functions at the same time, is not yet
available.
2.3. Bargaining problems and solutions
As before, a nonempty compact topological space A is the set of riskless
alternatives. Let RDU1 and RDU2 : LðAÞ-R be the RDU-functionals of two
bargainers with utility functions U1 and U2 and weighting functions w1 and w2;
respectively. A designated element % aAA is the disagreement alternative. We assume
throughout that there is a lottery PALðAÞ with RDU1ðPÞ4U1ð% aÞ and
RDU2ðPÞ4U2ð% aÞ: The two bargainers try to reach an agreement in LðAÞ: If they
fail, % a results. The quadruple ðA; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ is called a (two-person) bargaining
problem. B is the set of all bargaining problems.
For a bargaining problem B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ; deﬁne
SðBÞ¼clfðRDU1ðPÞ;RDU2ðPÞÞ : PALðAÞg
and
dðBÞ¼ð U1ð% aÞ;U2ð% aÞÞ;
where ‘cl’ denotes the (topological) closure. The point dðBÞ is called the disagreement
outcome. The set SðBÞ is called the feasible set of B: It is a compact subset of R2: In
contrast to the case of bargaining problems under expected utility, examples (with
inﬁnite A) can be constructed where the set fðRDU1ðPÞ;RDU2ðPÞÞ : PALðAÞg is not
closed.
We deﬁne
S ¼f ð S;dÞ : S ¼ SðBÞ and d ¼ dðBÞ for some BABg:
A bargaining solution is a map F : S-R2 that assigns to each ðS;dÞAS an element of
S: In the rest of the paper, we also write FðBÞ instead of FðSðBÞ;dðBÞÞ:
2.4. Feasible sets of bargaining problems
Under expected utility, the set of all possible feasible sets is the set of all compact
convex sets in R2: Because of continuity of the weighting functions, a feasible set
SðBÞ is connected under rank-dependent utility, but it is not necessarily convex. It
does, however, satisfy a weaker form of convexity, as formulated in the following
lemma.
For any points s and t in R2 denote by ½s;t  the straight line segment with s and t as
endpoints, i.e., the convex hull of s and t: The vector inequality t4s means ti4si for
i ¼ 1;2; and tXs means tiXsi for i ¼ 1;2:
V. K. obberling, H. Peters / Journal of Economic Theory 110 (2003) 154–175 158Lemma 2.3. Let ðS;dÞAS: Then for all s;tAS with s1 ¼ t1 or s2 ¼ t2 we have
½s;t DS:
This lemma implies in particular that a feasible set S is not only connected but also
simply connected: it contains no ‘holes’ (cf. Lemma A.1 in the appendix).
For ðS;dÞAS the Pareto optimal set PðSÞ is deﬁned by
PðSÞ¼f sAS : there exists no tAS with tXs and tasg:
Instead of PðSðBÞÞ we also write PðBÞ:
The following lemma implies that the Pareto optimal set is connected.
Lemma 2.4. Let ðS;dÞAS: Then there is a closed interval ICR and a continuous
strictly decreasing function f : I-R such that PðSÞ is the graph of f, that is,
PðSÞ¼f ð t;fðtÞÞ : tAIg:
Lemma 2.4 says that Pareto optimal subset of a feasible set S behaves nicely: there
are no indentations nor even horizontal or vertical line segments. Analogous results
can be derived for the other parts of the boundary of S (cf. Lemma A.3 in the
appendix). Lemma 2.3 implies that also the possibly ﬂat parts in the north, east,
south, and west cannot have indentations.
The next lemma provides a partial answer to the converse question: Which
nonempty compact subsets S of R2 can be generated as feasible sets of bargaining
problems under rank-dependent utility? The lemma says that every connected
compact Pareto optimal set can be generated by an underlying bargaining
problem.
Lemma 2.5. Let ICR be a nonempty closed interval and let f : I-R be a continuous
strictly decreasing function. Then there is a BAB such that PðBÞ is the graph of f,
that is,
PðBÞ¼f ð t;fðtÞÞ : tAIg:
2.5. The Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution
For ðS;dÞAS; the utopia point is deﬁned by
uðS;dÞ¼ð maxfs1 : sAS;sXdg;maxfs2 : sAS;sXdgÞ:
For BAB we also write uðBÞ instead of uðSðBÞ;dðBÞÞ: The Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution KS [6] assigns to each ðS;dÞAS the maximal point of S on the line segment
with d and uðS;dÞ as endpoints. It is well deﬁned because S is compact. By Lemma
2.4, KSðS;dÞ is a Pareto optimal point for every ðS;dÞAS:
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utility. Under expected utility, the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution can be justiﬁed and
characterized by a set of axioms [6]. This axiomatization can be extended to the
rank-dependent utility case, as we will show in Section 4.
3. Sensitivity of the KS bargaining solution to risk
We investigate the sensitivity of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution to
changes in the risk attitude of the bargainers. We ﬁrst assume that both bargainers
weakly prefer all riskless alternatives to the disagreement alternative, a condition
which will be weakened in Section 3.4. We examine the changes in the outcome
suggested by the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution if the risk aversion of one
of the players changes. First, we keep the weighting function ﬁxed and vary the
utility function; second, we keep the utility function ﬁxed and vary the weighting
function. The ﬁrst case is a generalization to rank-dependent utility of known results
for expected utility.
Deﬁne Bþ ¼f BAB : sXdðBÞ for all sASðBÞg:
3.1. Utility risk aversion
Theorem 3.1. Let B and C be bargaining problems in Bþ that are identical except that
player 2 is more utility risk averse in C than in B. Then KS1ðBÞpKS1ðCÞ:
The theorem says that a player does not lose when bargaining with a (new) more
utility risk averse opponent. Fig. 1(a) illustrates this. In the ﬁgure, we use the fact
that under rank-dependent utility, the utility function is unique up to scale and
location and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution satisﬁes scale invariance (see Section
4), so player 2’s utility function in bargaining problem C can be scaled such that
dðBÞ¼dðCÞ and uðBÞ¼uðCÞ:
Fig. 1. Diagram (a) illustrates Theorem 3.1 and diagram (b) illustrates Theorem 3.2. In both diagrams,
z ¼ KSðBÞ and ˆ z ¼ KSðCÞ: The solid dots correspond to riskless alternatives.
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Theorem 3.2. Let B and C be bargaining problems in Bþ that are identical except
that player 2 is more probabilistically risk averse in C than in B. Then
KS1ðBÞXKS1ðCÞ:
Theorem 3.2 says that a player does not proﬁt from bargaining with a (new) more
probabilistically risk averse opponent. This is illustrated in Fig. 1(b), where the
utility functions of players 2 in B and C are taken to be equal (cf. Lemma 2.2, part 2,
and recall that KS is scale invariant).
Observe that both in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 the players 2 in B and C are different
players, so that neither these results nor the associated diagrams imply anything
about gains or losses of these players. See also the discussion below.
3.3. Discussion and strategic implications
Although utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion have a similar impact
on the preferences of a decision maker, namely, the more utility or probabilistically
risk averse a player is, the less lotteries are preferred over each sure alternative, they
have contrary effects in bargaining problems with respect to the Kalai–Smorodinsky
bargaining solution. An intuition for this is as follows. If a player can choose
between a more and a less utility risk averse opponent, it is advisable to choose the
more utility risk averse one, because the marginal utility of the more utility risk
averse player diminishes faster, so that this player is easier to satisfy. But if a
player can choose between a more and a less probabilistically risk averse
opponent, it is advisable to choose the less probabilistically risk adverse one,
because the more probabilistically risk averse player weighs probabilities for
alternatives with high outcomes lower and therefore asks for more security for
obtaining high outcomes.
These considerations represent a positive view: they are of interest for the case in
which the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution offers a good description of the bargaining
outcome. Additionally, it is interesting to consider the strategic implications of
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 for a bargainer under the assumption that preferences are
private knowledge, so that it is possible to be dishonest about the true preferences.
These implications are relevant from a normative point of view, in particular, for the
question of mechanism design.
Let B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ be a bargaining problem, where RDU2 corres-
ponds to the true preferences of player 2. We consider four cases, namely that
player 2 pretends to be more or less utility or probabilistically risk averse. For
simplicity, it is assumed for the rest of this subsection that A is ﬁnite. This ensures
that the image of LðAÞ in R2 is closed and, therefore, it also ensures the existence
of a lottery with rank-dependent utility image equal to the point suggested by the
Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Nevertheless, analogous results can be derived for
inﬁnite A:
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preferences represented by g RDU RDU2? Let C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1; g RDU RDU2Þ: We assume that
g RDU RDU2 is scaled such that dðBÞ¼dðCÞ and uðBÞ¼uðCÞ: Let P;QALðAÞ such that
KSðBÞ¼ð RDU1ðPÞ;RDU2ðPÞÞ and KSðCÞ¼ð RDU1ðQÞ; g RDU RDU2ðQÞÞ: Theorem 3.1
implies that RDU1ðPÞpRDU1ðQÞ: If RDU1ðPÞoRDU1ðQÞ; then Pareto optimality
implies RDU2ðPÞ4RDU2ðQÞ: If RDU1ðPÞ¼RDU1ðQÞ; then RDU2ðPÞ¼
g RDU RDU2ðQÞ; because dðBÞ¼dðCÞ and uðBÞ¼uðCÞ: But g RDU RDU2ðQÞXRDU2ðQÞ by
Lemma 2.2 . Hence, in every case RDU2ðPÞXRDU2ðQÞ: Thus, player 2 never proﬁts
from pretending to be more utility risk averse.
2. Does it make sense for player 2 to pretend to be less utility risk averse, with
preferences represented by d RDU RDU2? Nothing can be said in general here, as the
following example shows.
Example 3.3. Let A ¼f ð 0;0Þ;ð1;0Þ;ð0;1Þ;ð0:55;0:55Þg; % A ¼f ð 0;0Þ;ð1;0Þ;ð0;1Þ;
ð0:5;0:9ÞÞg; % a ¼ð 0;0Þ; UiðaÞ¼ai for iAf1;2g; ˆ U2ð0Þ¼0; ˆ U2ð0:55Þ¼0:2; ˆ U2ð0:9Þ¼
0:55; ˆ U2ð1Þ¼1; and w1ðpÞ¼w2ðpÞ¼ ˆ w2ðpÞ¼p for all pA½0;1 : Let B ¼
ðA; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ and C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1; d RDU RDU2Þ: Moreover, let % B ¼
ð % A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ and % C ¼ð% A; % a;RDU1; d RDU RDU2Þ: The lotteries that give rise to





% P ¼ð 2
7;ð1;0Þ; 5
7;ð0:5;0:9ÞÞ;







o0:55 ¼ RDU2ð % QÞ:
Hence, pretending to be less utility risk averse can be advantagous (player 2 in the
pair % B; % C) but also disadvantagous (player 2 in the pair B;C). &
3. Does it make sense for player 2 to pretend to be less probabilistically risk averse
with preferences represented by d RDU RDU2? Let C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1; d RDU RDU2Þ; and assume
again that the utility function ˆ U2 of player 2 is scaled such that dðCÞ¼dðBÞ and
uðCÞ¼uðBÞ; i.e., ˆ U2 ¼ U2: Let P;QALðAÞ such that KSðBÞ¼ð RDU1ðPÞ;
RDU2ðPÞÞ and KSðCÞ¼ð RDU1ðQÞ; d RDU RDU2ðQÞÞ: Theorem 3.2 implies that
RDU1ðPÞpRDU1ðQÞ: If RDU1ðPÞoRDU1ðQÞ; then Pareto optimality implies
RDU2ðPÞ4RDU2ðQÞ: If RDU1ðPÞ¼RDU1ðQÞ; then RDU2ðPÞ¼ d RDU RDU2ðQÞ;
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Hence, in every case RDU2ðPÞXRDU2ðQÞ: Thus, player 2 never proﬁts from
pretending to be less probabilistically risk averse.
4. Does it make sense for player 2 to pretend to be more probabilistically risk
averse, with preferences represented by g RDU RDU2? Nothing can be said in general here,
as the following example shows.
Example 3.4. Let A ¼f ð 0;0Þ;ð1;0Þ;ð0;1Þg; % A ¼ A,fð0:55;0:55Þg; % a ¼ð 0;0Þ;




; ˜ w2ðpÞ¼p for all pA½0;1 :
Let B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ and C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1; g RDU RDU2Þ; and let % B ¼
ð % A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ and % C ¼ð% A; % a;RDU1; g RDU RDU2Þ: The lotteries that give rise to








RDU2ð % PÞE0:62540:55 ¼ RDU2ð % QÞ:
Hence, pretending to be more probabilistically risk averse can be advantagous
(player 2 in the pair % B; % C) but also disadvantagous (player 2 in the pair B;C). &
3.4. Extension from Bþ to B
In this subsection the restrictions in Theorem 3.2 on bargaining problems are
weakened. Riskless alternatives are permitted that are worse than the disagreement
alternative for one or both players. In the following, we only consider the effect of
weighting functions. For results concerning utility risk aversion in the expected
utility case, see [12].
Unfortunately, Theorem 3.2 cannot be generalized to an arbitrary compact set A
of riskless alternatives without any further restrictions, as the following example
shows.





; ˜ w2ðpÞ¼p for all pA½0;1 : Let B ¼
ðA; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ and C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1; g RDU RDU2Þ: Then
KSðBÞEð0:724;1:929Þ




Hence player 1 obtains more in the game with the more risk averse player 2. &
Nevertheless, we can still partially generalize Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.6. Let B and C be bargaining problems in B that are identical except that








Condition (1) says that the line segment with dðCÞ and uðCÞ as endpoints is steeper
(has a higher slope) than the line segment with dðBÞ and uðBÞ as endpoints. If
dðBÞ¼dðCÞ—which can always be arranged without loss of generality—condition
(1) holds in particular if U1ðaÞXd1ðBÞ for all aAA; that is, if player 1 weakly prefers
all riskless alternatives to the disagreement alternative.
4. An axiomatization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution
The Kalai–Smorodinsky solution for rank-dependent utility bargaining problems
can be characterized by a similar set of conditions as in the expected utility case (see
[6]). The axioms are as follows, formulated for a bargaining solution F:
Symmetry: For every ðS;dÞAB with (i) if ðs1;s2ÞAS then also ðs2;s1ÞAS; (ii) d1 ¼
d2; we have F1ðS;dÞ¼F2ðS;dÞ:
Scale invariance: For all ðS;dÞAS and a;bAR2 with a40; we have FðaS þ b;ad þ
bÞ¼aFðS;dÞþb; where ax :¼ð a1x1;a2x2Þ for all xAR2 and aS þ b :¼f as þ b :
sASg:
Weak Pareto optimality: For every ðS;dÞAS there is no xAS with x4FðS;dÞ:
Individual monotonicity: For all ðS;dÞ;ð % S; % dÞAS and all iajAf1;2g with (i) % SDS;
(ii) % d ¼ d; and (iii) uið % S; % dÞ¼uiðS;dÞ; we have Fjð % S; % dÞpFjðS;dÞ:
Observe that these conditions still make sense in the rank-dependent utility setting.
In particular, scale invariance reﬂects the fact that the utility function in rank-
dependent utility is unique up to a positive linear transformation. Also the following
characterization is similar to the one obtained in [6] but in the proof (see the
appendix) the construction of auxiliary bargaining problems needs special attention
because of the different domain, in particular the presence and construction of
nonconvex problems.
Theorem 4.1. Let F be a bargaining solution. Then F satisﬁes symmetry, scale
invariance, weak Pareto optimality and individual monotonicity if, and only if, F ¼ KS:
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It has been shown in this paper that, with respect to the Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution, in many situations it is on the one hand not advantagous to bargain against
a more probabilistically risk averse opponent, but on the other hand also not
advantagous to bargain against a less utility risk averse opponent. These results are
surprising, since both probabilistic and utility risk aversion arise from the same
deﬁnition of risk aversion. The intuition behind the results could be that a more
utility risk averse bargainer is easier to satisfy and is therefore less demanding in a
bargaining problem, whereas a more probabilistically risk averse bargainer wants a
higher guarantee to obtain good outcomes and is therefore more demanding. In this
paper, we varied the attitude towards risk either with respect to the weighting
function or with respect to the utility function, and kept the other component ﬁxed.
It may be interesting to design an experiment to test which of the two components
has more inﬂuence in bargaining problems.
The main results can be generalized to n-person bargaining problems
with the restriction that the feasible sets are made comprehensive. It is also
possible to adapt the results to bargaining solutions exhibiting certain mono-
tonicity properties. For instance, the egalitarian bargaining solution deﬁned on the
set of comprehensive problems or the Kalai–Rosenthal solution [5] are such
candidates.
The extension of the Nash bargaining solution [9] to bargaining problems
under rank-dependent utility is more problematic. In particular, feasible sets
are not necessarily convex, so that the Nash bargaining solution is not
uniquely deﬁned. Nevertheless, even if we restrict attention to bargaining
problems where the Nash bargaining solution is well deﬁned, it does not behave
regularly. Both cases can arise: a player can gain or lose with respect to the Nash
bargaining solution when bargaining with a more probabilistically risk averse
opponent.
Cumulative prospect theory [19] differs from rank-dependent utility in the sense
that probabilities are weighted in a different way, depending on whether the
associated riskless alternatives are preferred to a speciﬁc reference point or not. All
of the above results can be generalized to cumulative prospect theory. There, a
distinction between gains and losses is made, and a third factor inﬂuences the risk
attitude of a decision maker, namely loss aversion. The impact of loss aversion in
bargaining problems is a subject for further research. Also Shalev [16] considers loss
aversion in bargaining but in a quite different framework.
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Before proving Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 we ﬁrst prove some auxiliary results from
which these lemmas will be derived. By jj   jj we denote the Euclidean norm on R2:
We say that a feasible set S has a hole if there is an hAR2 and an e40 such that (i)
xeS for all xAR2 with jjx   hjjoe and (ii) for every xAR2 with xa0 there is a
number lx40w i t hh þ lxxAS:
Lemma A.1. Let B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2ÞAB: Then SðBÞ contains no holes.
Proof. Deﬁne T ¼f ð RDU1ðPÞ;RDU2ðPÞÞ : PALðAÞg: By deﬁnition, SðBÞ¼clfTg:
We say that T contains an almost-hole if there exists an hAR2 and a e40 such that (i)
xeS for all xAR2 with jjx   hjjoe and (ii) there is a yAR2 such that for every xAR2
with xa0 and xaty for every number tX0 there is a number lx40 with h þ lxxAS:
Since T is connected and SðBÞ is the closure of T; it is sufﬁcient to show that T
contains no almost-holes. We ﬁrst prove the following claim.
Claim. For all s;tAT with either s1 ¼ t1 or s2 ¼ t2 the straight line segment between
these two points is contained in T, i.e., ½s;t DT:
Proof. Let s;tAT with s2 ¼ t2 (the case s1 ¼ t1 is analogous). Let P ¼
ðp1;a1;y;pk;akÞ and Q ¼ð q1;b1;y;qn;bnÞALðAÞ with ðRDU1ðPÞ;RDU2ðPÞÞ ¼ s
and ðRDU1ðQÞ;RDU2ðQÞÞ ¼ t: Without loss of generality, assume that all
probabilities in P and Q are positive, and let C ¼f a1;y;ak;b1;y;bng: Let U2 be
the utility function of player 2.
Case 1: For all cAC; U2ðcÞ¼s2: Then all lotteries on elements of C have rank-
dependent utility equal to s2 for player 2 and all points in ½s;t  can be obtained by
such lotteries. Hence, ½s;t DT:
Case 2: There are c; ˜ cAC with U2ðcÞaU2ð˜ cÞ: Let % cAarg maxfU2ðcÞ : cACg and
%
cAarg minfU2ðcÞ : cACg: Clearly, U2ð% cÞ4s24U2ð
%
cÞ: Let R ¼ð r; % c;1   r;
%
cÞ be the
unique lottery with RDU2ðRÞ¼s2: Let r ¼ð RDU1ðRÞ;RDU2ðRÞÞ; then we will show
that the straight line segment between s and r is in T: Similarly, it can be shown that
the straight line segment between r and t is in T: Therefore, the straight line segment
between s and t is contained in T:
Observe that for every lottery ˜ P ¼ð˜ p1;a1;y; ˜ pk;ak; ˜ pkþ1; % c; ˜ pkþ2;
%
cÞ with
RDU2ð ˜ PÞ¼s2; for every iAf1;y;kg and for every e with 0pep˜ pi; there exist
some l;pX0 with l þ p ¼ e such that for the lottery e Pe Pe ¼ð˜ p1;a1;y; ˜ pi 1;ai 1;
˜ pi   e;ai; ˜ piþ1;aiþ1;y; ˜ pk;ak; ˜ pkþ1 þ l; % c; ˜ pkþ2 þ p;
%
cÞ we have RDU2ð e Pe PeÞ¼s2:
Starting with P we now gradually construct new lotteries with RDU2-value equal
to s2 by shifting, for every aief% c;
%
cg; the corresponding decision weight pi in a
continuous way, simultanously to % c and
%
c until we reach R; such that the RDU2-
value stays constant. In this way, we obtain every point on the straight line segment
between s and r as the image of at least one of the contructed lotteries. This
completes the proof of the claim. &
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contains an almost-hole, and let hAR2 be as in the deﬁnition of an almost-hole. In
particular, there exist lð1;0Þ;lð 1;0Þ40w i t hh þ lð1;0Þð1;0Þ;h þ lð 1;0Þð 1;0ÞAT; or
there exist lð0;1Þ;lð0; 1Þ40 with h þ lð0;1Þð0;1Þ;h þ lð0; 1Þð0; 1ÞAT: Assume the
former is the case, the latter is analogous. Observe that ðh þ lð1;0Þð1;0ÞÞ2 ¼
ðh þ lð 1;0Þð 1;0ÞÞ2 ¼ h2: Hence the claim implies that ½h   lð 1;0Þð1;0Þ;h þ
lð1;0Þð1;0Þ DT: In particular, hAT; which contradicts (i) in the deﬁnition of an
almost-hole. Therefore, T contains no almost-holes and the proof of the lemma is
complete. &
The following lemma is needed to derive Lemma 2.4.
Lemma A.2. Let B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2ÞAB with utility functions U1 and U2 and
weighting functions w1 and w2 for players 1 and 2, respectively. Let
% b2Aarg maxfU2ðaÞ: aAAg and % b1Aarg maxfU1ðaÞ: aAAg: Let S ¼ SðBÞ and
xAPðSÞ: Then
(i) if x2oU2ð% b2Þ then for every e40 there is a yASw i t hy 1ox1; y24x2; and
jjx   yjjoe;
(ii) if x1oU1ð% b1Þ then for every e40 there is a yASw i t hy 2ox2; y14x1; and
jjx   yjjoe:
Proof. We only prove (i), the proof of (ii) is analogous. Suppose that (i) is not true.
Together with xAPðSÞ this implies that there is a # e40 such that
S-fyAR2 : jjy   xjjo# e;y24x2g¼|: ð2Þ
Let PALðAÞ be an arbitrary lottery with RDU2ðPÞpx2: Such a lottery is of the
form P ¼ð p0; % b2;p1;a1;y;pn;anÞ with U2ð% b2ÞXU2ða1ÞX?XU2ðanÞ; and possibly,
p0 ¼ 0:
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w2ðp0Þp






















This proves the claim. &
Claim 2. Let m ¼ 1
2ðx2 þ U2ð% b2ÞÞ; and let kAf1;y;ng such that U2ðaiÞom3iXk:
Then there is a number 0o
%





















¼w2ðp0ÞU2ð% b2Þ w2ðp0Þm þ wðp0 þ ? þ pk 1Þ½m   U2ð
%
b




Xw2ðp0 þ ? þ pk 1Þ½m   U2ð
%
b





w2ðp0 þ ? þ pk 1Þp










p0 þ ? þ pk 1pw 1
2













piX1   w 1
2












This proves the claim. &
Claim 3. Let % p and
%
p be as in Claims 1 and 2, and let 0oepminf1   % p;
%
pg: Let m and k
be as in Claim 2 and let Pe be a lottery obtained from P by increasing p0 with e and
weakly decreasing, for i ¼ k;y;n; pi with eiX0 such that
Pn
i¼k ei ¼ e: Then there is a
number 0orðeÞAR; independent of P, such that RDU2ðPeÞXRDU2ðPÞþrðeÞ:
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%
wðeÞ :¼ minfw2ðq þ eÞ w2ðqÞ :0 pqp1   eg: Observe that
%
wðeÞ40:








w2ððp0 þ eÞþp1 þ ? þ pk 1 þð pk   ekÞþ? þð pi   eiÞÞ












½w2ðp0 þ p1 þ ? þ piÞþ
%










wðeÞ½U2ð% b2Þ m :
The claim follows by deﬁning rðeÞ :¼
%
wðeÞ½U2ð% b2Þ m : &
For the next claim, let
%
b
1Aarg minfU1ðaÞ : aAAg:
Claim 4. Let Z40 and let Q ¼ð q1;a1;y;qn;anÞ and QZ ¼ð˜ q1;a1;y; ˜ qn;anÞ be
arbitrary lotteries such that QZ arises from Q by shifting around probability such that Pn
i¼1 jqi   ˜ qijpZ: Then there are positive numbers M1ðZÞ and M2ðZÞ; independent of
Q, such that jRDU1ðQÞ RDU1ðQZÞjpM1ðZÞ and jRDU2ðQÞ RDU2ðQZÞjpM2ðZÞ;
and, moreover, M1ðZÞ;M2ðZÞ-0 as Z-0:
Proof. We only prove the ﬁrst inequality, the proof of the second one is analogous.





w1ðq1 þ ? þ qiÞ½U1ðaiÞ U1ðaiþ1Þ  þ U1ðanÞ




w1ð˜ q1 þ ? þ ˜ qiÞ½U1ðaiÞ U1ðaiþ1Þ    U1ðanÞ
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X n 1
i¼1
½w1ðq1 þ ? þ qiÞ w1ð˜ q1 þ ? þ ˜ qiÞ ½U1ðaiÞ U1ðaiþ1Þ 
         




maxfjw1ðq þ ZÞ wðqÞj :0 pqp1   Zg½U1ðaiÞ U1ðaiþ1Þ 
pM1ðZÞ;




M1ðZÞ-0a sZ-0 the proof of Claim 4 is complete. &
We will now complete the proof of the lemma. Take a sequence of lotteries
P1;P2;y with ðRDU1ðPcÞ;RDU2ðPcÞÞ-x as c-N: Assume without loss of
generality that jjðRDU1ðPcÞ;RDU2ðPcÞÞ   xjjo# e
4 for every c: By (2), RDU2ðPcÞpx2
for every c: Take Z40 so small that M1ðZÞ;M2ðZÞo# e
4 (with M1ðZÞ; M2ðZÞ as in Claim
4). Finally, take e40 with 2eoZ and 0oepminf1   % p;
%
pg (as in Claim 3). Then
Claim 3 implies that for an c0 sufﬁciently large we have RDU2ðPe
c0ÞXRDU2ðPc0Þþ
rðeÞ4x2; with Pe
c0 and rðeÞ as in Claim 3. Since 2eoZ it follows by Claim 4 that
jRDU1ðPc0Þ RDU1ðPe









c0ÞÞ   xjjo# e whereas RDU2ðPe
c0Þ4x2; contradicting (2). This
completes the proof of lemma. &
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Let % x be the point of S with maximal ﬁrst coordinate among
the points of S with maximal second coordinate. Similarly, let
%
x be the point of S
with maximal second coordinate among the points of S with maximal ﬁrst
coordinate. Clearly, % x and
%
x are Pareto optimal points, and for every point xAPðSÞ
we have % x1px1p
%
x1:
To prove the lemma it is sufﬁcient to prove that for every aAR with % x1pap
%
x1
there is a number fðaÞAR with ða;fðaÞÞAPðSÞ: such a number must then be unique
and the implied function f is strictly decreasing and, by Lemma A.2, also
continuous. Hence, f satisﬁes the requirements of the lemma.




x2: For aAR with % x1oao
%
x1
deﬁne fðaÞ :¼ maxfb : ða;bÞASg: Suppose ða;fðaÞÞePðSÞ: Then let x be the point
with maximal ﬁrst coordinate among all points of D :¼f yAS :yXða;fðaÞÞg with
maximal second coordinate. Clearly, xAPðSÞ; x14a; and x2o% x2: Then Lemma
A.2(i) implies that there is a point yAD with y24x2; a contradiction to the deﬁnition
of x: This completes the proof of the lemma. &
For ðS;dÞAS we deﬁne
PþþðSÞ¼f sAS : there exists no tAS with t1Xs1;t2Xs2 and tasg;
Pþ ðSÞ¼f sAS : there exists no tAS with t1Xs1;t2ps2 and tasg;
P þðSÞ¼f sAS : there exists no tAS with t1ps1;t2Xs2 and tasg;
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P  ðSÞ¼f sAS : there exists no tAS with t1ps1;t2ps2 and tasg:
Observe that PþþðSÞ¼PðSÞ:
The following lemma is a generalization of Lemma 2.4. The proof can proceed
completely analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.4, and is therefore omitted. The
lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 2.3.
Lemma A.3. Let ðS;dÞAS: Then there are closed intervals Iþþ; Iþ ; I þ; and
I  DR; continuous strictly decreasing functions f þþ : Iþþ-R; f    : I  -R and
continuous strictly increasing functions f þ  : Iþ -R; f  þ : I þ-R such that
PþþðSÞ¼f ð t;f þþðtÞÞ : tAIþþg;
Pþ ðSÞ¼f ð t;f þ ðtÞÞ : tAIþ g;
P þðSÞ¼f ð t;f  þðtÞÞ : tAI þg;
P  ðSÞ¼f ð t;f   ðtÞÞ : tAI  g:
Proof of Lemma 2.3. We ﬁrst observe that the points of S with maximal second
coordinates form a straight line segment, possibly consisting of only one point: all
these points can be obtained by lotteries between riskless alternatives with minimal
and maximal utility for player 1 among all the riskless alternatives that have
maximal utility for player 2. The same is true for all points with minimal second
coordinates, or maximal or minimal ﬁrst coordinates.
Let s;tAS be points that have one coordinate in common. Without loss of
generality assume s1ot1 and s2 ¼ t2: If s2 is maximal or minimal in S then ½s;t DS
follows from the observations in preceding paragraph. Otherwise, any point hA½s;t 
strictly between s and t satisﬁes condition (ii) in the deﬁnition of a hole: this follows
from the observations in the preceding paragraph and from Lemma A.3. Suppose
that there would be such an h with heS: Since S is closed there must be an e-
neigborhood of h that is not in S: Hence, h satisﬁes also condition (i) in the deﬁnition
of a hole, and thus S has a hole. This contradicts Lemma A.1 and completes the
proof. &
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Let I ¼½ a;b : If aab; deﬁne the continuous strictly increasing
function w : ½0;1 -½0;1  by
w
b   t





for every tAI: In particular, wð0Þ¼0 and wð1Þ¼1; so that w satisﬁes all the
requirements of a weighting function.
If a ¼ b; then for % a take any point in R2 with % aoða;fðaÞÞ:
Deﬁne A ¼f% a;ða; % a2Þ;ða;fðaÞÞ;ð% a1;fðaÞÞg:
If aab then take % a ¼ð a;fðbÞÞ: Deﬁne A ¼f% a;ðb;fðbÞÞ;ða;fðaÞÞg:
V. K. obberling, H. Peters / Journal of Economic Theory 110 (2003) 154–175 171Deﬁne UiðaÞ¼ai for all aAA and iAf1;2g; w1ðpÞ¼p and w2ðpÞ¼wðpÞ for all
pA½0;1 : Let B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ: By construction,
fðt;fðtÞÞ : tAIg¼f ð RDU1ðPÞ;RDU2ðPÞÞ : P ¼ð ð a;fðaÞÞ;p;ðb;fðbÞÞ;1   pÞ
for some pA½0;1 g:
This is the set PðBÞ; and by Lemma 2.3, SðBÞ¼f xAR2 : % apxpðt;fðtÞÞ
for some tAIg: &
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ; C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1; g RDU RDU2ÞABþ
such that RDU2 is associated with U2 and w2 and g RDU RDU2 with ˜ U2 ¼ k 3 U2 and w2 for
a concave strictly increasing transformation k : R-R: It can be assumed that f U2 U2 is
scaled such that dðBÞ¼dðCÞ and uðBÞ¼uðCÞ; since the Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution is scale invariant (see Theorem 4.1). This implies that ˜ U2ðaÞXU2ðaÞ for all
aAA and therefore,
g RDU2 RDU2ðPÞXRDU2ðPÞð 3Þ
for all PALðAÞ: Consider KSðBÞ: Because dðBÞ¼dðCÞ and uðBÞ¼uðCÞ; we either
have KSðBÞpKSðCÞ or KSðBÞ4KSðCÞ: Weak Pareto optimality of the Kalai–
Smorodinsky solution (see Theorem 4.1) and (3) imply KSðBÞpKSðCÞ; hence
KS1ðBÞpKS1ðCÞ: &
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ; C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1; g RDU RDU2ÞABþ
such that RDU2 is associated with U2 and w2 and g RDU RDU2 with U2 and ˜ w2 where
w2ðpÞX ˜ w2ðpÞ for all pA½0;1 : (Hence, without loss of generality we have scaled the
utility function of player 2 in C such that it is equal to U2; cf. Lemma 2.2.) Then by
Lemma 2.2, part 2,
RDU2ðPÞX g RDU RDU2ðPÞð 4Þ
for all PALðAÞ: Consider KSðCÞ: Because dðBÞ¼dðCÞ and uðBÞ¼uðCÞ; either
KSðCÞpKSðBÞ or KSðCÞ4KSðBÞ: Weak Pareto optimality of the Kalai–
Smorodinsky solution (see Theorem 4.1) and (4) imply KSðCÞpKSðBÞ; hence
KS1ðBÞXKS1ðCÞ: &
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Let B ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2Þ; C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1; g RDU2 RDU2ÞAB
such that RDU2 is associated with U2 and w2 and g RDU RDU2 with U2 and ˜ w2 where




u1ðCÞ d1ðCÞ: Because the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution is scale invariant (see
Theorem 4.1) we can assume without loss of generality that dðBÞ¼dðCÞ¼ð 0;0Þ:
Deﬁne HðCÞ to be the maximal point of SðCÞ on the line segment with dðBÞ and
uðSðBÞ;dðBÞÞ as endpoints. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, it can be shown that
HðCÞpKSðBÞ: ð5Þ








This contradicts the Pareto optimality of HðCÞ: It follows that
KS1ðCÞpH1ðCÞ: ð6Þ
From (5) and (6),
KS1ðCÞpKS1ðBÞ;
which was to be proved. &
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Symmetry, scale invariance and individual monotonicity of
the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution are immediate. (Weak) Pareto optimality follows
from Lemma 2.4.
Let F be a bargaining solution which satisﬁes symmetry, scale invariance, weak
Pareto optimality and individual monotonicity. We show that F ¼ KS: Our proof
deviates from the proof in [6] because also certain nonconvex feasible sets are
permitted.
Let ðS;dÞAS: Deﬁne T ¼f as þ b :sASg with a ¼ð 1
u1ðS;dÞ d1; 1
u2ðS;dÞ d2Þ and





So it is sufﬁcient to prove that KSðT;0Þ¼FðT;0Þ: Note that uðT;0Þ¼ð 1;1Þ and,
therefore,
KS1ðT;0Þ¼KS2ðT;0Þ:
Let C ¼ð A; % a;RDU1;RDU2ÞAB such that T ¼ SðCÞ and 0 ¼ dðCÞ: Let U1 and U2
be the associated utility functions.
First consider the case that uðT;0Þ¼ð 1;1ÞAT; hence KSðT;0Þ¼ð 1;1Þ: Since, by
Lemma 2.4, PðTÞ¼f ð 1;1Þg; there must be an aAA with ð1;1Þ¼
ðRDU1ðaÞ;RDU2ðaÞÞ: Deﬁne C0 ¼ð f% a;ag; % a;RDU1;RDU2ÞAB where RDU1 and
RDU2 are the restrictions of the rank-dependent utility functionals in C: With L :
¼ SðC0Þ; we have FðL;0Þ¼ð 1;1Þ by weak Pareto optimality of F: By individual
monotonicity of F applied to LDT we have FðT;0ÞXFðL;0Þ¼ð 1;1Þ; hence
FðT;0Þ¼ð 1;1Þ¼KSðT;0Þ: This completes the proof of the theorem for this case.
Second and last, consider the case that uðT;0Þ¼ð 1;1ÞeT; hence
KSðT;0Þoð1;1Þ: By Lemma 2.4 there is a function f; the graph of which
coincides with PðTÞ: Deﬁne y :¼ð minfx1 : xATg;minfx2 : xATgÞ: Let B ¼
ð % A;ð0;0Þ;RDU1;RDU2Þ; where
% A ¼f ð U1ðaÞ;U2ðaÞÞ : aAAg,fy;ðy1;maxfx2 : xATgÞ;ðmaxfx1 :xATg;y2Þg;
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functions % wi equal to those in C: Then dðBÞ¼0; PðBÞ¼PðTÞ; and
SðBÞ¼f xAR2 : ypxpx0 for some x0APðTÞg:
Denote ˜ T ¼ SðBÞ: Then uð ˜ T;0Þ¼ð 1;1Þ and TD ˜ T; so by individual monotonicity of
F; Fð ˜ T;0ÞXFðT;0Þ: Since KSð ˜ T;0Þ¼KSðT;0Þ; it is sufﬁcient to show that
Fð ˜ T;0Þ¼KSð ˜ T;0Þ: then KSðT;0ÞXFðT;0Þ which implies KSðT;0Þ¼FðT;0Þ since
KSðT;0Þoð1;1Þ:
Let z :¼ KSð ˜ T;0Þ (so z1 ¼ z2) and let f : ½0;1 -½0;1  be a continuous strictly
decreasing function with ðt;fðtÞÞA ˜ T; fðz1Þ¼z2; and fðtÞ¼f  1ðtÞ for every tA½0;1 :
Then fð0Þ¼1; fð1Þ¼0; and by Lemma 2.5 and its proof there is a ðV;0ÞAS with
PðVÞ equal to the graph of f and V ¼f xAR2 :0 pxpx0 for some x0APðVÞg:
Because V is symmetric by construction, symmetry and weak Pareto optimality of F
imply FðV;0Þ¼z: Since uðV;0Þ¼ð 1;1Þ and VD ˜ T; individual monotonicity of F
implies Fð ˜ T;0ÞXFðV;0Þ¼z; hence Fð ˜ T;0Þ¼z ¼ KSð ˜ T;0Þ since zAPð ˜ TÞ: This
completes the proof of the second case, and hence of the theorem. &
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